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National Security v. Civil Liberties
Geoffrey R. Stonet
How should judges approach deciding cases that involve the
constitutionality of measures taken by the executive and legislative branches of
government to protect the national security? As a matter of first principle, logic
suggests that judges addressing such cases should start with a healthy dose of
deference to military and executive officials.
This seems sensible for several reasons. First, judges have relatively little
experience with national security matters. Such cases arise infrequently, and
judges are relative novices when it comes to assessing the possible implications
of their decisions on national security. This cuts in favor of deference. Second,
the stakes in such cases may be quite high. Unlike most legal disputes, in which
erroneous judicial decisions have only modest consequences and are usually
correctible, the potential consequences to the nation if a judge is wrong in a
case involving the national security may be truly catastrophic. Hence, a certain
measure of deference seems wise. Third, for institutional reasons, judges
should be reluctant to second-guess the judgments of military and executive
officials in such conflicts because if they err they may harm not only the
national security but also the long-term credibility of the judiciary itself. Again,
logic demands deference.
Not surprisingly, in light of these reflections, judges have traditionally
followed this "logical" course when addressing conflicts between civil liberties
and the national security. They have presumed-seemingly sensibly-that the
actions of military and executive officials were constitutional whenever they
acted in the name of national security. The three most dramatic twentieth-
century clashes between civil liberties and the national security illustrate this
approach.
When the United States entered the First World War in April 1917, there
was strong opposition to both the war and the draft. President Woodrow Wilson
had little patience for such dissent. Only weeks after the United States entered
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the war, Congress enacted the Espionage Act of 1917.1 A year later, it enacted
the Sedition Act of 1918. 2 These laws effectively made it a crime for any
person to criticize the government, the president, the draft, the war, the
Constitution, or the United States' military. The Department of Justice
prosecuted more than 2,000 individuals for alleged disloyalty, and in an
atmosphere of fear, hysteria, and clamor, most judges were quick to mete out
severe punishment to those deemed disloyal. The result was the suppression of
virtually all criticism of the war.
3
Rose Pastor Stokes, for example, the editor of the socialist Jewish Daily
News, was sentenced to ten years in prison for saying "I am for the people,
while the government is for the profiteers" during an antiwar statement to the
Women's Dining Club of Kansas City.4 D.T. Blodgett was sentenced to twenty
years in prison for circulating a leaflet urging voters in Iowa not to reelect a
congressman who had voted for conscription.5 The Reverend Clarence H.
Waldron was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for distributing a pamphlet
stating that "if Christians [are] forbidden to fight to preserve the Person of their
Lord and Master, they may not fight to preserve themselves, or any city they
should happen to dwell in."
6
In a series of decisions in 1919 and 1920, the Supreme Court consistently
upheld the convictions of individuals who had agitated against the war and the
draft. 7 Embracing the "logical" presumption for balancing civil liberties and
national security concerns in time of war, the Court explained its reasoning:
"When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as
men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right."
8
In the years after World War I, Americans increasingly came to recognize
that these prosecutions had been excessive. Officials who had served in the
Wilson administration conceded that the general atmosphere of intolerance had
led to serious constitutional violations and criticized some federal judges for
1. 40 Stat. 217 (1917).
2. 40 Stat. 553 (1918).
3. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 180-82 (2004); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE
SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 256-57 (1997).
4. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 53 (1941) (emphasis
added).
5. See WALTER NELLES, ESPIONAGE ACT CASES 48 (1918).
6. CHAFEE, supra note 4, at 55.
7. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 333 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239,
252 (1920); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 624 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919); Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 53 (1919).
8. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
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having "lost their heads." 9 Over the next few years, the federal government
acknowledged that injustices had been done in the name of national security
and every person who had been convicted of seditious expression during World
War I was released from prison and granted amnesty.' 0 In later years, the
Supreme Court implicitly overruled its World War I era decisions, effectively
acknowledging that it had failed in its responsibility to protect constitutional
rights during wartime."
The critical civil liberties issue in World War II arose out of the Japanese
internment. On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed
Executive Order 9066, which authorized the Army to designate military areas
from which "any or all persons may be excluded."' 12 Although the words
"Japanese" or "Japanese American" never appeared in the Order, it was
understood to apply only to persons of Japanese ancestry.' 3 Over the next eight
months, almost 120,000 individuals of Japanese descent were forced to leave
their homes in California, Washington, Oregon and Arizona. Two-thirds of
these men, women and children were American citizens, representing almost
90% of all Japanese Americans. No charges were brought against these
individuals; there were no hearings; and they did not know where they were
going, how long they would be detained, what conditions they would face, or
what fate would await them. They were told to bring only what they could
carry. Many families lost everything. The internees were transported to one of
ten permanent internment camps and placed in overcrowded rooms with no
furniture other than cots. Surrounded by barbed wire and military police, they
remained in these detention camps for some three years. 14
Why did this happen? Certainly, the days following Pearl Harbor were
dark days for the American spirit. Fear of possible Japanese sabotage and
espionage was rampant, and an outraged public felt an understandable instinct
to lash out at those who had attacked the country. But this act was also very
much an extension of more than a century of racial prejudice against the
"yellow peril." Racist statements and sentiments permeated the debate from
December 1941 to February 1942 about how to deal with individuals of
9. Letter from Alfred Bettman to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., October 27, 1919, excerpted in
DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 328 (Cambridge University Press
1997).
10. See STONE, supra note 3, at 230-32.
11. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445-47 (1969) (rejecting the standard applied
in the World War I cases for curtailment of First Amendment rights).
12. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).
13. Id. On March 21, 1942, Congress implicitly ratified the Executive Order by providing
that violation of the order of a military commander was unlawful. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, §
1383, 62 Stat. 683, 765 (repealed 1976).
14. See COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED 2-3 (1982); STONE, supra note 3, at 283-96; GEOFFREY R. STONE, WAR AND
LIBERTY: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1790 TO THE PRESENT 64-67 (2007).
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Japanese descent.15 Although the Department of Justice maintained that a mass
evacuation of Japanese Americans was both unnecessary and unconstitutional,
and although FBI director J. Edgar Hoover reported to Attorney General Biddle
that the demand for mass evacuation was based on "public hysteria" rather than
fact,1 6 FDR nonetheless signed the Executive Order, largely for political
reasons. 1942 was an election year, and Roosevelt did not want to alienate
voters on the West Coast.
1 7
In Korematsu v. United States,' 8 decided in 1944, the Supreme Court
embraced the "logical" presumption for dealing with conflicts between civil
liberties and national security. In a six-to-three decision, the Court, in an
opinion by Justice Black, upheld the President's action:
[W]e are not unmindful of the hardships imposed ...upon a large
group of American citizens. But hardships are part of war, and war is
an aggregation of hardships .... To cast this case into outlines of racial
prejudice ... confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the
[West Coast] because of hostility to ...his race. He was excluded
because ... the ... military authorities ... decided that the military
urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese
ancestry be segregated from the [area] .... We cannot-by availing
ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight-now say that at that
time these actions were unjustified. 19
In the years after World War II, attitudes about the Japanese internment
began to shift. On February 19, 1976, as part of the celebration of the
Bicentennial of the Constitution, President Gerald Ford issued Presidential
Proclamation 4417, in which he acknowledged that, in the spirit of celebrating
our Constitution, we must recognize "our national mistakes as well as our
national achievements." "February 1 9 h,'' he noted, "is the anniversary of a sad
day in American history," for "[i]t was on that date in 1942 ... that Executive
Order 9066 was issued.",20 President Ford observed that "[w]e now know what
we should have known then"-that the evacuation and internment of loyal
Japanese Americans was "wrong.
' 21
In 1980, Congress established the Commission on Wartime Relocation
15. See COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, supra note 14,
at 4-6 (discussing the circumstances surrounding the decision to exclude and remove Japanese
aliens and Japanese Americans from the West Coast).
16. DON WHITEHEAD, THE FBI STORY: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE 189 (1956) (quoting
Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., FBI, to Francis Biddle, U.S. Attorney General).
17. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 42 (1983); STONE, supra note 3, at 286-96; STONE,
supra note 14, at 73-74.
18. 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)
(upholding the constitutionality of the curfew order); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943)
(same).
19. 323 U.S. at 219, 223-24.
20. Proclamation No. 4417, An American Promise, 41 Fed. Reg. 7741 (Feb. 19, 1976).
21. Id.
[Vol. 95:22032206
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and Internment of Civilians to review the implementation of Executive Order
9066. 22 The Commission, composed of former members of Congress, the
Supreme Court and the Cabinet, as well as several distinguished private
citizens, unanimously concluded that the factors that shaped the internment
decision "were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political
leadership," rather than military necessity. 23 Several years later, President
Ronald Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 1988, which
officially declared that the Japanese internment was a "grave injustice" and
offered an official Presidential apology and reparations to each of the Japanese
American internees who had suffered discrimination, loss of liberty, loss of
property, and personal humiliation because of the actions of the United States
government. 24 Over the years, Korematsu has become a constitutional pariah.
The Supreme Court has never cited it with approval of its result.
25
As World War II drew to a close, the nation moved almost seamlessly into
the Cold War. During this era, the nation demonized members of the
Communist Party and the long shadow of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities fell across our campuses and our culture. Red-hunters
demanded, and got, the blacklisting of thousands of individuals and a fear of
ideological contamination swept the nation. 26 The key constitutional decision
in this era was Dennis v. United States,27 which involved the prosecution under
the Smith Act of the leaders of the American Communist Party. The indictment
charged the defendants with conspiring to advocate the violent overthrow of the
government. In a six-to-two decision, the Court held that their convictions did
not violate the First Amendment. The Court concluded that because the violent
overthrow of government is such a grave harm, the danger need be neither clear
28
nor present to justify suppression.
Over the next several years, in a series of decisions premised on Dennis,
the Court upheld the Subversive Activities Control Act, sustained far-reaching
legislative investigations of "subversive" organizations and individuals, and
affirmed the exclusion of members of the Communist Party from the bar, the
ballot and public employment. 29 In so doing, the Court clearly put its stamp of
22. See COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, supra note 14,
at 1.
23. Id. at 5, 8.
24. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989-1989a (2000).
25. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, "The Achilles Heel" of the Constitution: Justice Jackson and
the Japanese Exclusion Cases, in 2002 SuP. CT. REV. 455, 485 n.99.
26. See generally RALPH S. BROWN, JR., LOYALTY AND SECURITY: EMPLOYMENT TESTS IN
THE UNITED STATES (1958); FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND
METHODS OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM (1980); STONE, supra note 3, at 312-
93; STONE, supra note 14, at 85-106; ATHAN THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS: POLITICAL
SURVEILLANCE FROM HOOVER TO THE HUSTON PLAN (1978).
27. 341 U.S. 494(1951).
28. Jd. at 509-11.
29. See, e.g., Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S.
2007] 2207
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approval on an array of actions we today look back on as models of
McCarthyism. As the historian David Caute has concluded, "the Constitution
was concussed in the courts," including the Supreme Court, which too often
served as "a compliant instrument of administrative persecution and
Congressional inquisition."
' 30
As the aforementioned episodes illustrate, the dominant approach of the
Supreme Court in the first-half of the twentieth-century to resolving conflicts
between civil liberties and the national security was to employ the "logical"
presumption that military and executive officials making wartime decisions act
fairly and reasonably. For all the reasons that I have identified, the Court
embraced a highly deferential stance, presuming that restrictions of civil
liberties in wartime were constitutionally justified so long as the government
could offer a reasonable explanation for its actions. But this approach proved
disastrous. Schenck, Korematsu, and Dennis have all come to be regarded as
constitutional failures and black marks on the Court's reputation.
Although a presumption of deference to executive and military officials in
wartime may be logical in theory, it fails in practice. With the benefit of
hindsight, the reasons for this failure are evident. A policy of deference
assumes that those making the critical judgments are properly taking the
relevant factors into account in a fair and reasonable manner. If they fail to do
so, the underlying rationale for deference is destroyed. As it turns out, the
essential predicate for a policy of judicial deference in these circumstances is
predictably lacking.
Government officials responsible for the nation's security tend to
exaggerate the dangers facing the nation both to protect themselves in the event
they fail and to persuade legislators and the public to grant them as much power
as possible. Moreover, government officials charged with responsibility for the
nations' security tend not to be particularly sensitive to the importance of civil
liberties and are therefore too quick to sacrifice those liberties to achieve their
primary goal of safeguarding the national security. Finally, opportunistic
politicians tend to exploit periods of real or perceived crisis for partisan and
personal gain. A time-honored method of gaining or consolidating power is to
incite public fear, demonize an internal "enemy," and then "protect" the public
by prosecuting, interning, deporting, and spying upon those accused of
1, 112-15 (1961) (upholding the Subversive Activity Control Board's requirement that
Communist and Communist-front organizations register with the government); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959) (upholding the power of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities to require a Vassar College instructor to answer questions about his past and
present membership in the Communist Party); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952)
(upholding a New York law providing that no person who knowingly becomes a member of an
organization advocating the violent overthrow of government may be appointed to any position in
a public school).
30. DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND
EISENHOWER 144 (1978).
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"disloyalty."
These three considerations are not exhaustive, but they adequately explain
why the "logical" presumption of judicial deference to executive and military
officials inevitably leads to decisions like Schenck, Korematsu, and Dennis. It
is pointless, indeed dangerous, to defer to those whose judgments are likely to
be distorted by such influences. As a practical matter, military and executive
officials will invariably overvalue national security concerns at the expense of
civil liberties. There may be sound reasons for judges to be cautious when they
second-guess military and executive officials, but pragmatism-informed by
experience--demands that courts be more rigorous in their exercise of judicial
review if we are to avoid more decisions like Schenck, Korematsu, and Dennis.
Of course, the comparative advantage of courts over the executive and
legislative branches in interpreting and enforcing individual liberties is familiar.
Responsiveness to the electorate may be essential to the day-to-day workings of
democracy, but that responsiveness can lead the government too readily to
sacrifice the rights of those who are regarded as different, dangerous, or
disloyal. Judges with life tenure and a more focused attention on the
preservation of civil liberties are more likely to protect our freedoms than the
elected branches of government.
3 1
Because we know from experience that there is a pattern of excessive
restriction of civil liberties in wartime, courts in the twenty-first century must
abandon the "logical" presumption of deference to executive and military
authority and employ a more rigorous standard of review. In light of
experience, we know that the "logical" presumption is counter-productive. The
lesson of decisions like Schenck, Korematsu and Dennis is that courts must
closely scrutinize invocation of military necessity and national security as
justification for limiting civil liberties. In fact, the Court, in part because of the
influence of Justice Brennan, has already learned the lessons of history and has
increasingly rejected the "logical" presumption. The Justices are acutely aware
of the Court's past failures, and no Justice wants his or her legacy to be tainted
by the next Schenck, Korematsu, or Dennis.
It is, of course, impossible to mark a precise moment at which the Court's
shift towards rejection of the "logical presumption" occurred, but a good
candidate would be June 17, 1957, shortly after Justice Brennan joined the
Court, when the Court handed down four decisions that reversed the course of
31. The framers were aware of this:
The independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the
rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing
men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the
people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information
and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the
community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
22092007]
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constitutional history. The most important of those decisions was Yates v.
United States,32 which put an end to the government's prosecution of
Communists under the Smith Act and effectively ended the era of
McCarthyism in the Supreme Court.33 Since that day, the Court has tended to
take a much more aggressive role in scrutinizing government invocations of
national security as a justification of limiting civil liberties in wartime.
Over the past half-century, at least five Supreme Court cases have posed
significant "civil liberties versus national security" conflicts somewhat
analogous to those in Schenck, Korematsu, and Dennis. The first two arose out
of the Vietnam War; the latter three involved the war on terrorism. In each of
these cases, the Court eschewed the sort of judicial deference that so ill-served
the nation in the earlier era.
The two Vietnam War cases implicated the First and Fourth Amendments,
respectively. New York Times Co. v. United States34 involved one of the most
dramatic confrontations in American constitutional history. The U.S.
government attempted to enjoin publication by the New York Times and the
Washington Post of the Pentagon Papers, a "top secret" study of the Vietnam
War prepared within the recesses of the Defense Department that had been
made available to the newspapers through an unprecedented breach of security.
The government maintained that continued publication of the Pentagon Papers
would grievously harm the national security. 35 In a six-to-three decision, the
Court declined to defer to the executive's national security claim and ruled that
the government could not constitutionally enjoin the publication. Justice
Stewart insisted that the government could not constitutionally enjoin the
publication because it had failed to prove that disclosure "will surely result in
direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation."
36
Several years later, President Richard Nixon maintained that the executive
was constitutionally exempt from the ordinary requirements of the Fourth
Amendment when it undertook national security investigations. Specifically,
the government argued that to protect the nation from violent acts of
subversion, the President must be free to engage in national security wiretaps
without complying with the warrant and probable cause requirements. In
United States v. United States District Court (Keith),37 the Court unanimously
rejected this contention, holding that even in national security investigations the
32. 354 U.S. 298 (1957). The other three decisions were Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957) (limiting HUAC's investigative activities); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957) (limiting state investigative activities); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) (limiting
loyalty-security dismissals).
33. See STONE, supra note 3, at 411-16.
34. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
35. See SANFORD J. UNGAR, THE PAPERS & THE PAPERS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE LEGAL
AND POLITICAL BATTLE OVER THE PENTAGON PAPERS 14 (1972).
36. N. Y Times, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
37. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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President has no constitutional authority to wiretap American citizens on
American soil without a judicially-issued search warrant based upon probable
cause. 38
More recently, the Supreme Court has addressed and sternly rejected the
Bush administration's claims of executive authority in the war on terrorism. In
three decisions, the Court has refused to grant deference of the sort that led to
the results in Schenck, Korematsu, and Dennis. In Rasul v. Bush,39 the Court
held that federal courts have habeas corpus jurisdiction to review the legality of
the confinement of the Guantanamo Bay detainees.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,40 decided on the same day as Rasul in 2004, the
Court went even further in its refusal to grant undue deference to the military
and executive officials in the war on terrorism. Yaser Hamdi, an American
citizen, was seized in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance (an American ally)
and turned over to the U.S. military. 4 1 In April 2002, Hamdi was covertly
shipped to a naval brig in Virginia. The Bush administration maintained that
Hamdi was an "enemy combatant" and that it could therefore detain him
indefinitely, without access to counsel, and without any formal charge or
proceeding. 42 In an eight-to-one decision, the Court held that this violated
Hamdi's right to due process of law. In her plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor
declared that "a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an
enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification,
and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertion before a
neutral decisionmaker." 43 O'Connor explained that it "is during our most
challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's commitment to due
process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve
our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad." 44 In
rejecting the government's contention that the Court should play "a heavily
circumscribed role" in reviewing the actions of the executive in wartime,
O'Connor pointedly observed that "a state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens. 45
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,4 6 as in Pentagon Papers, Keith, Rasul and
Hamdi, the Court declined to grant broad deference to the executive, instead
making its own independent determination of the legality of the President's
action. In this case, decided in June 2006, the Court held that the procedures
adopted by President Bush for military commissions violated the basic tenets of
38. See id. at 324.
39. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
40. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
41. Id. at 510.
42. Id. at 510-1I.
43. Id. at 533.
44. Id. at 532.
45. Id. at 536.
46. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2007] 2211
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military and international law. In a five-to-three decision, the Court held the
military commissions established by President Bush's executive order violated
both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The Court emphatically rejected the President's assertion that, as commander-
in-chief of the Army and Navy, he could constitutionally impose procedures
that were incompatible with traditional practice even though they violated both
federal and international law.
In terms of judicial review of conflicts between civil liberties and the
national security, the twenty-first century has gotten off to a rather good start.
Having learned from the mistakes of the past, the Court-or at least majority of
the Justices-has jettisoned the "logical" presumption evidenced in Schenck,
Korematsu, and Dennis and replaced it with the "pragmatic" presumption of
close judicial scrutiny evidenced in Rasul, Hamdi, and Hamdan. This is a
fundamental step forward in American constitutional history. Justice Brennan
would be pleased.
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